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ANOTHER VIEW OF Montero v. Meyer and the English-Only
Movement: Giving Language Prejudice the
Sanction of Law
As whites see their power and control over their lives declining, will
they simply go quietly into the night? Or will there be an explosion.
Will Latin American migrants bring with them the tradition of the
mordida (bribe), the lack of involvement in public affairs, etc. ? I
The memorandum above is but one indication of the hidden racism
that motivates the English-only movement. Behind the facade of benign
paternalism is an effort to erase the gains made by minorities during the
civil rights era and create greater divisions within our society. Propo-
nents of English-only contend that declaring English the "official" lan-
guage of the United States will promote national unity.2 By focusing on
language, the English-only proponents can avoid addressing the real
targets of their attack, the Hispanic immigrants. Language is only the
signal to identify these people and deny their basic rights of citizenship.
3
Recently, tactics used by the proponents of English-only were chal-
lenged in court.4 In parallel cases out of Colorado and Florida, the
plaintiffs challenged the failure to print initiative petitions in a second
language where required by the Voting Rights Act. 5 In both cases, the
federal courts of appeals found that the Act does not apply to initiative
petitions. 6 The plaintiffs then petitioned for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. However, in July 1989, the Supreme Court re-
fused to hear the plaintiffs' appeals.7 For the reasons stated below, the
authors of this article believe that the Court should have addressed this
issue.
This article begins by placing the legal issues raised in the present
litigation in the proper social context. Part I examines the goals of the
English-only movement, and the immediate threat posed to minority
voting rights. Comparisons are made to this nation's dark history of
polling abuses, which Congress sought to correct by passing the Voting
Rights Act. Part II of this Note applies the Voting Rights Act to the case
1. Excerpt from a memorandum written in 1986 by Dr. John Tanton, co-founder of
"U.S. English." A. CALIFA, DECLARING ENGLISH THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: PREJUDICE SPO-
KEN HERE 1, 55 n.221 (1989) (available through Legislative Council Washington, ACLU,
122 Maryland Avenue NE, Washington, D.C. 20002).
2. For a good discussion on this point see Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language
Amendment: Shield or Sword? 3 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 519 (1985).
3. CALIFA, supra note 1, at 56.
4. See Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988); Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d
1489 (11 th Cir. 1988).
5. Montero, 861 F.2d at 603; Delgado, 861 F.2d at 1489.
6. Montero, 861 F.2d at 607; Delgado, 861 F.2d at 1493.
7. Montero, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3249 (1989); Delgado,
861 F.2d 1489 (1lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3242 (1989).
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arising out of Colorado, Montero v. Meyer.8 By failing to print initiative
petitions in minority languages, the English-only defendants in Montero
effectively denied the right of minority citizens to participate in this pro-
cess of amending the state constitution. As this case illustrates, the Eng-
lish-only movement is a direct assault on the values fostered during the
civil rights era.
I. THE GOALS OF THE ENGLISH-ONLY MOVEMENT
There are two factions supporting English-only legislation: "Eng-
lish First" founded by Lawrence Pratt, a Virginia state legislator; and
"U.S. English" ("USE") founded by Dr. John Tanton and former Sena-
tor S.I. Hayakawa. 9 Public figures such as Arnold Schwarzenegger, Alis-
tair Cooke, and Walter Cronkite have all served on the Board of
Advisors of USE.' 0 Dr. Tanton was also founder of the Federation of
American Immigration Reform ("FAIR"), a group lobbying for stricter
immigration policies."
In 1986, leaders of the English-only movement met at the WITAN
IV conference. 12 In a private memorandum written for the conference
Tanton asked: "How will we make the transition from a dominant non-
Hispanic society with a Spanish influence to a dominant Spanish society
with non-Hispanic influence?"' 3 Dr. Tanton's writings indicate that the
English-only movement is not simply a struggle over language, but be-
tween races:
In the California of 2030, the non-Hispanic Whites and Asians,
will own the property, have the good jobs and education, speak
one language and be mostly Protestant and 'other.' The Blacks
and Hispanics will have the poor jobs, will lack education, own
little property, speak another language and will be mainly Cath-
olic. Will there be strength in this diversity? or [sic] will this
prove a social and political San Andreas Fault?
14
It is easy to forget that this country was built as a nation of immi-
grants. Immigrants have enriched our culture, including our language,
injecting it with vitality that is essential to our continued cultural devel-
opment. Immigrants have provided our nation with leaders, as well as
farmers and merchants, and with entrepreneurs, as well as laborers.
15
Immigrants have reinforced our belief in America as a unique land of
8. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
9. CALIFA, sUpra note 1, at 11-12.
10. Id. at 13.
11. Id. at 12.
12. "Witan" is derived from an Old English word meaning "members of a council of
wise men." CALIFA, supra note 1, at 53 n.217 and accompanying text.
13. Id. at 55 n.221 and accompanying text. As a result of this publication, both Walter
Cronkite and Linda Chavez resigned from USE, fearing the impact on the Hispanic
community.
14. Id. at 56 n.225.
15. For a good discussion of immigration at the turn of the century see R. GINGER,
THE AGE OF ExCESS (1975).
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opportunity, having left their homes with the hope of finding something
better.
Numerous immigrant groups have confronted hostility upon their
arrival in America. In the last half of this century and as a result of revo-
lutions and stagnating economies in third world countries, the immi-
grants have been primarily Southeast Asians, Cubans, Puerto Ricans,
and Mexicans-all non-Anglos and most non-English speaking.
The leaders of English-only fear these newest groups of non-Anglo
immigrants. This fear is prompted, in part, by the belief that these im-
migrants have different values that are incompatible with the majority of
English-speaking Americans. 16 Furthermore, they have the opportunity
to assert these values as a formidable voting force.
A. The Voting Rights Act
Throughout our country's history different groups have demanded
greater power to influence political decision making. Initially, these de-
mands were perceived as a threat to the established political order. Per-
sons without property interests, women, and blacks all have had to
overcome difficult obstacles to obtain the right to vote.17 The history of
the enfranchisement of language minorities has been no different. Our
experience has taught us, however, that whenever a group has been ex-
tended this right, it has not weakened our system of government, but
has strengthened it. The democratic franchise provides minority groups
with a valuable outlet for political expression.
In 1870, the fifteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
extended to blacks the right to vote. iS However, states were able to
circumvent the intent of the fifteenth amendment through numerous
methods. These included grandfather clauses, property qualifications,
good character tests, gerrymandering, poll taxes, and requirements that
the applicant be able to read and interpret materials. 19
The persistence of states in seeking new means of circumventing
the fifteenth amendment is illustrated by two Texas cases. In Smith v.
Allwright, the Supreme Court declared that political parties could not re-
strict their primary elections to whites only.2 0 "When primaries become
a part of the machinery for choosing officials,. . . the same tests to deter-
mine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied
to the primary as are applied to the general election."12 1
In an effort to evade the ruling of Allwright, the whites-only Jaybird
Democratic Association held pre-primary elections; the successful candi-
16. Leibowicz, supra note 2, at 546.
17. See, e.g., L. BANNER, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON (1980).
18. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
19. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 (1966).
20. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
21. Id. at 664.
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date would then go on to run in the Texas Democratic primary. The
Supreme Court struck down this purportedly private action in Terry v.
Adams. 22 The Court reasoned that "the constitutional right to be free
from racial discrimination in voting 'is not to be nullified by a state cast-
ing its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization
to practice racial discrimination in the election.' ",23
As Terry illustrates, the fifteenth amendment applies to any private
actions serving an important electoral function. A state cannot delegate
a traditional state function to a private individual to avoid the reach of
the Voting Rights Act. In Montero v. Meyer, the English-only defendants
argued that the distribution of initiative petitions is a private action,
outside the purview of the fifteenth amendment. 24 However, to say that
the circulation of initiative petitions by individuals is not state action
flies in the face of Terry v. Adams.
Since Terry, Congress has repeatedly attempted to formulate legisla-
tion that would eliminate the problems of voter discrimination. The
Civil Rights Act of 1957, the perfecting amendments in the Civil Rights
Act of 1960, and Title 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were efforts by
Congress to outlaw methods used to deny minorities the right to vote.2 5
Despite the efforts of the Justice Department, these laws did little to
curtail the problem:
Even when favorable decisions have finally been obtained,
some of the states affected have merely switched to discrimina-
tory devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted
difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity be-
tween white and [black] registration. Alternatively, certain lo-
cal officials have defied and evaded court orders or have simply
closed their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls.
26
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. 2 7 Its intent was to
remedy the use of methods, which previously denied people of color the
right to vote. 28 The Act is broadly based and written in terminology
that is general and expansive in definition. It is written to give notice to
the states that any test, device, procedure, or standard which infringes
on the voting rights of minorities, no matter how subtle, will not be
tolerated.
29
During congressional hearings, Senator Fong voiced his concern
that the word "procedure," as used in section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, would not be broad enough to cover the various abuses employed
by states to subvert the Voting Rights Act. 30 Attorney General Katzen-
22. 345 U.S. 461, 465-69 (1953).
23. Id. at 466 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)).
24. 861 F.2d at 609.
25. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966).
26. Id. at 314.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1982).
28. See id. at § 1971.
29. Id.
30. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 & n.31 (1969); Voting Rights
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, title I, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (redesignated at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
636 [Vol. 66:4
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bach, who was instrumental in drafting the Voting Rights Act, explained
that the word "procedure" should include any kind of practice that
would deny or abridge the right to vote because of color or race. Kat-
zenbach suggested substituting the word "procedure" with the phrase
"standards, practices or procedures."''s Congress adopted this broader
language to give the Voting Rights Act the scope necessary to prevent
further infringement of minority voting rights.
3 2
The Voting Rights Act also covers changes made in the electoral
process. Before making any changes, jurisdictions covered by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b) must submit their proposals to the Attorney General or ob-
tain a declaratory judgment from the district court in Washington,
D.C.3 3 Changes in voting procedures will only be approved if they do
not abridge the voting rights of minority citizens.3 4 Previous exper-
iences, exemplified by Allwright and Terry, had taught the Justice Depart-
ment that as fast as they could declare one device illegal, the states
would find another means of carrying out their discriminatory intent.3 5
In the 1969 decision, Allen v. Board of Elections, the Supreme Court
heard four cases that involved the application of the Voting Rights
Act.3 6 In Whitley v. Williams, appellants challenged a Mississippi law that
revised the nominating petition process.3 7 Although Allen was decided
pursuant to section five covering election procedure changes, ChiefJus-
tice Warren, finding support for his ruling in the legislative history, de-
termined that the Voting Rights Act was applicable to procedural
changes in the petition process.
3 8
In hearing, the Attorney General Katzenbach remarked there were
two or three types of changes that may be specifically excluded from
section five, such as changing from a paper ballot to voting machines.
He emphasized, however, that there were "precious few" changes that
could be excluded "because there are an awful lot of things that could
be started for purposes of evading the fifteenth amendment if there is
the desire to do so.1' 39 Congress chose not to include these minor ex-
ceptions in section five, indicating their intent that all changes be subject
to section five scrutiny.
40
31. Allen, 393 U.S. at 566-67 n.31.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982).
33. Id. at § 1973c.
34. Id.
35. As Attorney General Katzenbach commented:
Our experience in the areas that would be covered by this bill has been such as to
indicate frequently on the part of State legislatures a desire in a sense to outguess
the courts of the United States or even to outguess the Congress of the United
States. . . . [Als the chairman may recall . . . at the time of the initial school
desegregation .... the legislature . . . passed a law to frustrate that decree.
Allen, 393 U.S. at 567-68.
36. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
37. Id. at 551.
38. See id. at 566-68. Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, title I, § 5, 79 Stat. 439
(redesignated and amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
39. Allen, 393 U.S. at 568.
40. Id.
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In 1975, the Voting Rights Act was extended to cover language mi-
norities. 4 1 As the basis for this extension, Congress had determined,
through the use of various practices and procedures, citizens of
language minorities have been effectively excluded from partic-
ipation in the electoral process. Among other factors, the de-
nial of the right to vote of such minority group citizens is
ordinarily directly related to the unequal educational opportu-
nities afforded them resulting in high illiteracy and low voting
participation.
42
Since 1975, America has been coming to grips with a newly evolving
political and economic scene. Vietnam, Nicaragua, Third World debt,
and our declining world economic dominance have forced us to reevalu-
ate our role as a world leader. For many Americans this reevaluation
has caused anxieties and fears about an uncertain future. The move-
ment to declare English the "official" language is a product of this
fear.
43
Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress to ban bilingual
education and declare English the "official" language. Although these
efforts were soundly defeated, the proponents of English-only have not
relented. On September 15, 1988, California Representative Norman
D. Shumway introduced the latest legislation, which has been endorsed
by USE. 44 The bill contains exceptions for bilingual education, teaching
foreign languages to students proficient in English, the use of court
translators, and the use of a language other than English for health or
safety reasons.45 There is no exception, however, for multilingual elec-
tion materials. 46 The Shumway bill is one more attempt to defeat the
Voting Rights Act.
Contrary to the assertions of English-only proponents, abolishing
the use of multilingual election materials will effectively deny the voting
rights of those citizens who are not fluent in English. In fact, this is
precisely what has happened in Montero v. Meyer.4 7 By failing to print
initiative petitions in minority languages, the proponents of English-
only effectively excluded non-English speaking citizens from participat-
ing in the first step of amending the Colorado constitution. The Voting
Rights Act is intended to address precisely this kind of concerted effort
to disfranchise voters.
II. APPLICATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT TO Montero v. Meyer
Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1975 to protect the
electoral privileges of language minority citizens. 4 8 The amendments to
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1982).
42. Id. at § 1973aa-la(a).
43. See CALIFA, supra note 1, at 1-13.
44. Id. at 18 n.81.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
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the Act require states to provide election materials in a second language
in every jurisdiction where the illiteracy rate is higher than the national
average and at least five percent of the voting population does not speak
English.49 This requirement applies whenever any state "provides" any
"materials or information relating to the electoral process." 50
Applying this language to the case of Montero v. Meyer raises two
issues of statutory interpretation. 5 1 The first issue is whether petitions
to initiate a constitutional amendment are "materials or information re-
lating to the electoral process." The second issue is whether the state
"provides" petitions when regulating and approving the form of those
petitions, when its officials assist in formulating the content of the initia-
tive, and when an elected state official uses state funds to promote the
initiative. In short, the issue is whether these acts are considered "state
action" for purposes of the Voting Rights Act.
A. Do the Language Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Apply to Initiative
Petitions?
To find an exemption from the Voting Rights Act, the English-only
proponents claim that initiative petitions are not "materials or informa-
tion relating to the electoral process." This assertion is untenable under
a plain reading of the Voting Rights Act.
As a prerequisite to placing initiatives on the ballot, petitions have a
clear relation to the electoral process. When deciding whether to sign a
petition, voters make an important choice that will determine whether a
proposed amendment will be placed on the ballot. The English-only
proponents would exclude from this process those citizens who are not
proficient in English.
1. Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act by the United States
Attorney General
In Montero v. Meyer, Colorado state election officials failed to comply
with the language provisions of the Voting Rights Act.52 When drafting
the Voting Rights Act, Congress chose not to leave such important
rights of citizenship to the exigencies of state and local officials. Such a
system would be ripe for abuse and was expressly rejected by Congress.
Instead, Congress gave broad enforcement powers to the United States
Attorney General.
53
On July 20, 1976, the Department of Justice promulgated regula-
tions stating that the written materials covered by the Voting Rights Act
include "petitions."' 54 Consistent with the statute, these regulations
49. Id. at § 1973c.
50. Id. at §§ 1973aa-la(c) & 1973b(f)(4).
51. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
52. Id.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
54. 28 C.F.R. § 55.19(a) (1988). The identical language was contained in a notice of
official rule making issued on April 21, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 16,773 (1976).
1989]
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place an affirmative duty on the states to interpret and enforce the Vot-
ing Rights Act: "It is the obligation of the jurisdiction to decide what
materials, must be provided in a minority language."
'55
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this language to
mean that the "jurisdiction" is vested with discretion to determine what
materials are covered by the Voting Rights Act.56 Such a reading brings
the regulations into direct conflict with the remedial goals of the statute.
When enacting the Voting Rights Act, Congress was faced with recalci-
trant state officials who sought to obstruct minority access to the electo-
ral process at every turn. Vesting these same state officials with
discretionary powers would render the Act meaningless.
The Justice Department recently reaffirmed its position in an ami-
cus brief filed in the case of Delgado v. Smith: "The Attorney General has
consistently interpreted Section 4(0(4) as covering' petitions."5 7 Judi-
cial deference to the Justice Department's regulations is appropriate in
the present case for two principle reasons. First, it is well established
that the interpretation of a statute given by its enforcing agency is enti-
tled to great judicial deference. 58 The rationale behind this rule is par-
ticularly compelling in this case, since the Attorney General played a
major role in drafting the Voting Rights Act and explaining its operation
to Congress. 59
Second, Congress had an opportunity to address this issue in 1982
when it extended the language provisions of the Voting Rights Act.
During the congressional hearings, the Justice Department provided
copies of the regulations, along with a letter stating that the bilingual
provisions applied to petitions.60 Being fully aware that the implement-
ing regulations applied the Voting Rights Act to petitions, Congress ex-
55. 28 C.F.R. § 55.19(a) (1988).
56. Montero, 861 F.2d at 608-09. The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the regulations
breaks two fundamental rules of construction. First, wherever possible, regulatory provi-
sions should be read in harmony. In this case, the regulations can be read consistently by
understanding the first provision to mean that each jurisdiction has an affirmative duty to
interpret and enforce the Voting Rights Act, and by understanding the second provision to
mean that a reasonable interpretation by such jurisdiction would include "petitions" as
material covered by the Act. The Tenth Circuit made no attempt to harmonize these pro-
visions.
Second, a specific provision in a regulation controls over a general provision. In this
case, the section listing "petitions" among election material covered by the Voting Rights
Act specifically addresses the issue of whether the Act covers petitions. Thus, even if the
disputed provisions cannot be read in harmony, the latter provision will prevail since it
directly addresses the issue.
57. Amicus brief for the United States at 1, 22, Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11 th
Cir. 1988).
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971).
59. See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468 (1987); United
States v. Board of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110, 131 (1978); Perkins v. Matthews, 400
U.S. 379, 391-92 (1971).
60. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on the Extension of the Voting Rights Act
Before the Subcomm. on Civil Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary: Hearings on S. 53, S.
1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1790 (1982).
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tended the Act without amendment. 6 1
2. What is "Voting?"
Recognizing the often elusive quality of state-sanctioned voting dis-
crimination, Congress adopted a remedial scheme consummate to the
task. The Voting Rights Act applies a broad definition of the term "vot-
ing" to include "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any pri-
mary, special or general election," including all actions "required by law
prerequisite to voting."
6 2
The proponents argue that the petition process is not an "action
required by law prerequisite to voting." To the contrary, Colorado law
prescribes in detail the steps that must be taken by the petitioner.
63
These steps are required by law and are a prerequisite to placing an
initiative on the ballot for voting. If the petitioner fails to gather a suffi-
cient number of signatures, the initiative will not be included on the
ballot. This process is clearly within the terms of the Voting Rights Act.
To advance the remedial objectives of the Voting Rights Act, the
Supreme Court has applied an expansive reading to the term "vot-
ing."6 4 In Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Court held a state reappor-
tionment plan to be within the terms of the Act.6 5 The Court stated that
"the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing
that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.' "66
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals tried to avoid this expansive
definition of the term "voting" by making reference to dictionary defini-
tions. 6 7 The court found that implicit in the definition of the concept of
voting is "the presence of choice."'68 The court, however, failed to ap-
ply this judicially contrived definition in a sensible manner when it
stated that the petition process "provides no choice."'6 9 The choice in
the petition process is clear: to sign or not to sign. It is this choice that
determines whether the initiative will be placed on the ballot.
As an example of covered activities, the Voting Rights Act lists voter
registration. 70 In Colorado, only registered voters can sign an initiative
petition.7 1 This fact is significant, first because it shows that the Voting
Rights Act reaches activities that occur prior to signing a petition. Sec-
ond, and more fundamentally, the registration requirement reflects the
importance of the constitutional initiative process. It is this process that
will determine whether a proposed initiative will be placed on the ballot.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
62. 28 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1988).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-101 to -109 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
64. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969).
65. Id. at 570-71.
66. Id. at 565-66.
67. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1988).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 28 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1988).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-106(2) (1973 & Supp. 1988).
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The state has a compelling interest in ensuring that this process of
amending the state constitution is conducted in a fair and orderly man-
ner. The Voting Rights Act advances this important state interest by
ensuring that the power of initiative is open to all qualified voters.
The power to amend the state constitution should not be construed
narrowly. In addition to the actual signing of a petition, the initiative
process includes public education and debate. Providing petitions in
minority languages aids this process by alerting language minority citi-
zens to the issues at stake. Once aware of the issues, these citizens can
fully exercise their democratic right to participate in the debate; they can
do so formally, through political parties and coalitions, or informally, by
discussing the issues among friends. By refusing to print petitions in
minority languages, the English-only proponents effectively excluded
minority citizens from this process.
B. Did the State "Provide" Election Material in Montero v. Meyer Within
the Meaning of the Voting Rights Act?
Admittedly, the Voting Rights Act applies to "state action" and not
private political speech such as the distribution of leaflets. 72 However,
the actions taken by the Official English Committee and state officials
during the initiative process in Montero v. Meyer are a far cry from the
private actions exempt from the Voting Rights Act.
1. Actions Taken by the State in Montero v. Meyer
To fully appreciate the issue of "state action," it is necessary to look
at the petition process in detail. The move in Colorado to put the Eng-
lish-only amendment on the ballot was initiated by State Representative
Barbara Anne Philips. In 1987, Representative Philips introduced a bill
making English the official language of Colorado.73 After the bill was
defeated in the legislature, Representative Philips and the Official Eng-
lish Committee began work toward a state-wide referendum.
74
As required by state law, Representative Philips first submitted a
draft of her proposal to the Colorado Legislative Council and the Legis-
lative Drafting Office for review and comment. 75 These two state agen-
cies sent Representative Philips a report containing their proposals and
comments, which she discussed with the staff members of the agencies.
Two days after this meeting, Representative Philips formally submitted
her initiative proposal to the Colorado Secretary of State.
76
The proposal incorporated two provisions added as a result of Rep-
72. The proponents of English-only argue that requiring petitions to be printed in a
minority language infringes the first amendment rights of petitioners. To the contrary, the
remedial tools used by the Voting Rights Act are narrowly tailored to promote a significant
governmental interest. The Act expands the political speech of language minority citizens,
while placing a minimal burden on petitioners.
73. Montero v. Meyer, 696 F. Supp. 540, 541 (D.Colo. 1988).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 543.
76. Id.
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resentative Philips' meeting with staff members of the two state agen-
cies. After receiving the proposal, the Secretary of State issued notices
of a public hearing to be held before a three-member state title board.
The board set the ballot title and submission clause for the initiative,
and prepared a summary of its contents. This information was included
in the printed petition forms, along with the language of the proposed
amendment. As a final step, a state elections officer corrected and ap-
proved the actual petition forms used by the Official English
Committee.
77
While Representative Philips used government resources at several
points in the petition process, a finding of "state action" should not
hinge upon this fact. The intimate involvement of state officials in the
statutory petition process should be a sufficient ground to find "state
action." The issue of whether statutorily mandated state action is
enough to bring the Voting Rights Act into play will receive its proper
focus in the parallel case from Florida, Delgado v. Smith, where the claim
of "state action" does not rely upon the spending of government
funds.
78
2. Is the Statutory Process of Amending the State Constitution "State
Action ?"
The language provisions of the Voting Rights Act apply whenever
any state "provides" any "materials or information relating to the elec-
toral process."' 79 In Montero v. Meyer, the state dictated the form, as well
as the content of the petition.80 The actual language of the proposed
constitutional amendment was reformulated as a result of discussions
with state officials. Most importantly, state officials approved the fact
that the petitions would only be printed in English.
The English-only proponents claim that these actions are merely
regulatory and, therefore, exempt from the Voting Rights Act. This ar-
gument misstates the issue. The issue is not whether these actions are
regulatory, but whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself."'8 ' In the
present case, the requisite "nexus" is established by the intimate in-
volvement of state officials setting the form and content of the petitions.
The state, in effect, "provides" election materials and is therefore active
in the petition process.
The initiation of proposed constitutional amendments is tradition-
ally a function of government. In Colorado, prior to 1910, state consti-
tutional amendments could be proposed only through actions of elected
officials or delegates. In 1910, the power to propose constitutional
77. Id.
78. 861 F.2d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1988).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-la(c) & 1973b(f)(4).
80. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
81. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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amendments was given to the people.8 2 This power was given to all of
Colorado's citizens, not just those who speak English.
CONCLUSION
The political struggle over the democratic franchise did not end
with passage of the fifteenth amendment. 83 Starting with Jim Crow
laws, the white majority sought to obstruct minority voting rights
through more insidious means like gerrymandering and poll taxes.
Though more subtle, the new forms of discrimination were no less per-
nicious. When Congress sat down to draft the Voting Rights Act in
1965, it sought to engender a higher notion of democracy-an idea of
democracy based on a process of inclusion to achieve full political
equality.
The struggle over the democratic franchise continues today. The
goals of the Official English movement are not limited to amending the
constitutions of individual states. Legislation has been introduced in
Congress that would ban bilingual education and prohibit multilingual
ballots.8 4 Such legislation, if passed, would arguably violate the consti-
tutional guarantees of equal protection and substantive due process.
With this in mind, the proponents can be expected to seek an amend-
ment to the federal Constitution making English the "official" language
of the United States.
These efforts to legislate conformity will only increase the divisions
within our society. The immediate impact will be to disfranchise voters
and disadvantage language minorities. Racial and cultural animosity will
be heightened as individuals find their prejudice sanctioned by law. In
the long run, the Official English movement will lead to greater eco-
nomic and social stratification. The Voting Rights Act must now be en-
forced to uphold the democratic rights of language minority citizens and
reinstill the values fostered during the civil rights era.
Paula Ison
Brant Seibert*
82. 1910 CoLo. SEss. Laws 1, 11-12.
83. Indeed, the struggle for women's suffrage was just beginning and continued until
passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920.
84. CALIFA, supra note 1, at 18 n.81.
* The authors would like to thank National Lawyer's Guild members Berry
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